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T he invitation to contribute to the current issue of the Philosophical Journal suggested that we should consider whether and how the notion of 
form -  the notion nearly as old as philosophy itself -  can still play an 
operative part in the philosophy of the postmodern age.
We claim that the answer to the question referring to the conditions of the 
possibility of »returning to form« depends upon another question, which, too, 
has already been indicated in the introductory presentation of the problem; 
namely, the question of whether and how a »return to Kant« is possible in 
postmodern philosophy, whether and how Kant can appear our contemporary. 
When defending our standpoint, we do not consider only the fact that the 
notion of form has acquired its modern meaning through Kant’s philosophy, 
that since Kant it has been connected with the conception of the universali­
zation of content which but establishes each moment of the content in its 
necessity and lawfulness. Rather, we bear in mind that the specific mode of 
reading Kant, which can be now observed in various contemporary philosophi­
cal currents, introduces the theoretical context that makes possible the reactua­
lization of the notion of form, its postmodern interpretation.
The »return to Kant,« as the only setting appropriate for philosophy after the 
end of metaphysics, was described by L. Ferry and A. Renaut in their article 
bearing the same title and published in the periodical Ornicar?1 in 1980. Their 
way of returning to Kant was described in more detail in their later works,2 
their basic claim being, in accordance with the original, that m an’s lim its 
should be considered 3 and that reason should now be restricted 4 and not 
praised or destroyed. Another characteristic of their view can be observed in 
the effort with which they try to demarcate their »Kantian orientation« from 
sterile repetition or restoration of Kant’s standpoints, and to present it as a 
constituent of live philosophical practice. In their opinion, »return to Kant« is 
possible and sensible only if it is different from the traditional research field of 
academic philosophy, if it is more than just »training of mind,«5 to use Kant’s
1. Cf. L. Ferry/A. Renaut, »Retour à Kant«, in: Ornicar?, No. 20-21, Seuil, Paris 1980.
2 . Cf. L. Ferry, Philosophie politique 1, PUF, Paris 1984, Philosophie politique Д PUF, Paris 
1984, L. Ferry/A. Renaut, Philosophie politique Д PUF, Paris 1985.
3 . Cf. L. Ferry, Philosophie politique 1, PUF, Paris 1984, p. 137.
4 . Cf. L. Ferry, Philosophie politique Д PUF, Paris 1984, p 16.
5 . I. Kant, »Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, gilt aber nicht für die 
Praxis«, Kant-Werkausgabe, vol. XI, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M 1971, p. 127.
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words. Their third characteristic is their regard for Kant as a posthegelian 
philosopher. For them, Kant does not represent the first step leading to the 
notion of all-embracing subjectivity, to the substance that has turned subject, 
but is in fact already the answer to the crisis and the decline of the absolute 
subject.
Within the complex of various philosophical orientations to contemporary 
philosophy, Ferry and Renaut are not the only ones to base their philosophical 
practice upon the reactualization of Kant’s concepts. If »return to Kant« is 
understood as a philosophical attitude that reads Kant so that he is implicitly 
or explicitly interpreted as a contemporary of the basic problems of 
postmodernity, so that the restoration of his concepts functions as radical 
reexamination of these problems, then it is possible -  with some schematic 
constraint -  to separate several variants of such an attitude from the 
heterogeneous complex of contemporary philosophies. In addition to L. Ferry 
and A. Renaut (and their teacher A. Philonenko, an excellent commentator 
and authority on Kant and Fichte), the »return to Kant« current also is 
represented in France by various poststructuralist and deconstructivist 
philosophical orientations.6 In Germany, Kant’s exegesis within the sphere of 
»school philosophy« not being taken into consideration, effectual Kantianism 
can be mentioned above all in the connection with the transcendental 
pragmatic of K.-O. Apel and the widely conceived theory of communicative 
activity of J. Habermas. The third variant of »return to Kant« can be found in 
Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy, especially in the works of R. Dworkin and J. 
Rawls.7
6 . We think above all o f J.-F. Lyotard, J. Derrida, J.-L. Nancy, and Ph. Lacoue-Labarth.
7 . The classification is taken from the book by J. Lenoble and A. Berten D ire le norme; E. 
Story-Scientia, Bruxelles 1990 (cf. also their article »Jugement juridique et jugement pratique: 
de Kant à la philosophie du langage«, in: R evue de la M étaphysique e t de morale, No 1, 
Armand Collin, Paris 1990). The authors, Belgian philosophers o f law, also refer to 
Kantianism as the only appropriate philosophical starting point for the articulation of the 
finality of reason. They understand their own standpoint as a kind of synthesis of 
deconstructivist radical decomposition of reason and postmodern Kantianism, developed by 
L. Ferry and A. Renaut. In their opinion, the basic thesis of neo-Kantianism, namely that 
Kantian criticism contains essential elements for the construction of metaphysical reason as 
well as positive condition of its postmetaphysical use, can be justified only on the basis o f the 
results of the philosophy of language. According to Lenoble and Berten, the postmodern 
comprehension of rationality is possible only on the basis o f the phenomenon they call »the 
paradox of the logic of enunciation.« The paradox, which they consider the logical operator 
of every production of meaning, is derived from the basic fact that there is no meta-language, 
that ordinary language is already its own meta-language. Kant's philosophy as an 
indispensable starting point of every theory of reason that wants to articulate the radical 
finality of the subject is to be reformulated on the basis of pragmatic turn in the 
contemporary philosophy of language; with the pragmatic-linguistic reformulation of Kant, 
we can also achieve the rational kernel of the philosophical standpoints of Ferry, Renaut and 
Habermas, who try to renew the project of western rationality by limiting the demands of 
reason. Lenoble and Berten consider this point of view justified, yet it loses sight of the 
constitutive role o f the paradox of enunciation, the impossibility and inconsistence of the
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Considering all three currents -  they are incompatible with one another, of 
course, and deep and unbridgeable differences exist among individual authors 
within the currents themselves, regarding not only basic concepts but also the 
specific mode of appropriation of Kant -  we come to three key features, 
which give contemporary »neo-Kantianism« its »postmodern« character.
First, with wider or narrower conceptual elaboration, the system of Kant’s 
three Critiques is interpreted, once already by Fichte, from the standpoint of 
Critique o f Judgment. In this case, the third Critique, however, plays the key 
role in understanding entire Kant’s philosophy, inasmuch as a special form of 
the power of judgment, the form of reflective judgment, is developed and 
treated in it. With the central position of the third Critique, entire Kantian 
ontology is subjected to »reflective« reading, the reading that revolves round 
the problem of Kant’s determinative judgment presupposing »reflective 
judgment in the very kernel of its foundation,«8 to use A. Philonenko’s 
formulation. In sharp contrast to the scientistic-instrumental conception of 
Kantian understanding being the legislator of nature, which secures only »its 
formal unity,«9 to use Kant’s words, and is methodologically separated from
universal, in short, it neglects the fact that »there is no meta-language as there is no language 
about All and the Universal«, J. Lenoble/A. Berten, Dire le norme Bruxelles 1990, p. 30). 
According to Lenoble and Berten, French as well as Habermas’ and Apel’s »neo-Kantianism« 
is insufficient if their accession is hermeneutic in addition. Ferry and Renaut reconstruct the 
postmetaphysical use o f reason in such a manner that they change Kantian ideas to the mere 
horizon o f meaning. Habermas and Apel find the demand for universal validity to be an 
indispensable pragmatic presupposition of every discourse. Their insufficiency consists in the 
fact that the demand for the universality of discursive logos is re-entered in the logical of the 
ideal of selfidentity, so that they idealiter presuppose the logic possibility of the identical 
universal. On the contrary, Lenoble and Berten claim that the universal, though understood 
as a mere horizon of meaning, represents a moment that is immanent in every discourse, yet 
transcending it at the same time (cf. J. Lenoble/A. Berten, op. cit,  p. 32). It really escapes the 
logic o f identity only when it is not comprehend as a moment that cannot be empirically 
achieved, but is rather understood as being impossible in itself. The ideal of reason, which is, 
to quote Habermas as an example, a constitutive condition of every communication in the 
form of presupposition of the consensuality of truth, must be comprehended, according to 
Lenoble and Berten, as entirely em pty form, as something that is nothing in its essence: »the 
ideal is an empty form -  inconsistent -  it is reduced to mere procedural rationality. The 
ideal as an exterior point of discourse returns in a certain way to what is the innermost in the 
operation of meaning, to the paradox, which moves it« (ibid.). In this place we cannot develop 
an explicit critique of Lenoble and Berten’s understanding, which tries to develop the positive 
concept of postmetaphysical reason by comprehending reason as an instance of the symbolic, 
as an empty space, round which a signifier’s network is structured. Such critique should state 
to what extent the empty space o f the symbolic can be preserved only by being always 
already embodied in some chaos of the real, inaccessible to symbolization. The implicit 
critique of such comprehension is included in our attempt at reading Kant from the 
standpoint of the anti-philosophy that deserves to be called »return to Kant«, although it is 
mentioned neither by Lenoble and Berten nor »neo-Kantianism« of Ferry, Renaut or 
Habermas, nor various philosophies o f deconstruction.
8 . Cf. A. Philonenko, L ’oeuvre de Kant I, Vrin, Paris 1989, p. 170.
9 . Cf. I. Kant, K ritik der reinen Vernunft, (KRV), Kant-Werkausgabe, vol. IV, Frankfurt/M 
1971, p. 702.
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empiric diversity, a question now stands out of how determinative, constitutive 
understanding is to be apprehended if a reflective element functions in the 
middle of it, if a use of understanding that is determined by the very absence 
of determination10 functions in the middle of determinative cognition.
The second characteristic of the postmodern »return to Kant« is connected 
with the enlargement of the applicative field of reflective judgment: Kant’s 
philosophy is interpreted as a standpoint that puts forward the radical finality 
of the subject and the irréductible contingency of the real. This is a matter of 
either, in its weaker variant, the use of certain segments of Kant’s philosophy
-  the theory of the sublime, the philosophy of the politico-historical etc. -  
within the scope of different philosophies of deconstruction; or in its stronger 
variant, Kantian criticism is comprehended as a philosophy that has so far 
criticized metaphysics most radically and in which the deconstruction of 
metaphysical reason has achieved its fulfillment. Its fulfillment because, in this 
latter case, Kant’s philosophy concedes the righteous claims of rationality even 
after critique of reason has been completed, since it develops the concept of 
rationality that is indispensable, yet at the same time paradoxical, in its nature 
and insubstantial, in short, because it develops the frame and positive 
conditions of the concept of postmetaphysical rationality: »The project of the 
critique of metaphysics which would not mean a complete denial of the claims 
of Reason is still open, and without exaggeration Kant can be said to remain 
the most important author on this way.«11
The third characteristic of postmodern »neo-Kantianism« is the interest in the 
status and the role of law and politics in contemporary democratic culture. In 
this connection, Kantian criticism is understood as a framework that provides 
conditions for the possibility of theorization of contemporary democracy, 
whereas the models of aesthetic and teleological reflective judgment are 
comprehended as a basic conceptual means that makes possible the answer to 
the question of what political conditions of freedom secure the realization of a 
lawful community of equal subjects.
In the continuation, we are going to limit ourselves to the first characteristic of 
the postmodern »return to Kant,« interpreting the »reflective« reading of 
Kant’s philosophy in more detail.
We know that Kant often compares critical philosophy to a tribunal. 
According to Kant, it is typical of the age of critique, in which we live, that 
reason has begun to get to know itself once again, for which purpose it has 
founded a tribunal, which protects its righteous claims and rejects the 
unfounded ones. This tribunal is Critique of Pure Reason.12 The purpose of
10. Philonenko has in mind the chapter in which Kant treats the problems of transcendental 
deduction in Critique o f Pure Reason.
11. Cf. L. Ferry, »Preface«, in: Critique de la Raison pure, Flammarion, Paris 1987, p. XXII.
12. I. Kant, KRV, toc. cit., p. 13.
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philosophy as critique is not to propagate cognition but its justification, 
critique being a touchstone of the validity or invalidity of all a priori cognition. 
Critique as such a propaedeutic enterprise is indispensable, for it prevents 
reason from falling into dogmatism, the mode of cognition that is based only 
on the principles of pure cognition without examining their origin and their 
justification beforehand.
The essential characteristic of critical philosophy -  tribunal -  is that the 
verdicts of this tribunal are, to use the language of Critique o f Judgment, 
reflective judgments, that critical philosophical findings have the structure of 
reflection. In the most general sense, this reflexive structure can be defined as 
follows: a verdict as a finding  that distinguishes and decides upon something is 
possible only if the judgment includes the standpoint of the instance bringing 
the verdict, if the point of enunciation, too, is a constitutive part of the 
verdict. However, this standpoint is not given at the very beginning; it is only a 
result of the verdict activity: »To reflect [überlegen] is to hold given 
presentations up to, and compare them whim, etiher other presentations or 
one’s cognitive power [itself], in reference to a concept that this [comparasion] 
makes possible.«13 Reflection is judgment that is but establishing, inventing 
the universal notion, on which it rests and relies during the process of 
judgment.
Lyotard also calls attention to the structural analogy of critique and reflective 
judgment in his essay L ’enthousiasme,14 According to Lyotard, the work of 
critique is to judge the demand for validity, made by different cognitive 
powers and propositions belonging to them -  empiric, rational, dialectic, 
teleological propositions, etc. In the proposition pointing to the truth, it judges 
whether and how it can reach it; the propositions pointing to the good or 
introducing the moral norm are judged in the same way -  in short, critique 
judges the appropriate use of cognitive power each time, and limits it to its 
»realm,« its »territory« or its »domain«,15 using the notions of the third 
Critique. During cultural development, reason must have achieved a certain 
degree of self-knowledge, the cognition of its range and bounds in order to 
establish itself as a tribunal. Kant even says that the tribunal of pure reason 
follows the »eternal and unchangeable laws« of reason16. But the philosopher 
given the role of the critical arbiter cannot judge the demands for the validity 
of different cognitive propositions with the help of stable rules of universal 
validity; »he has neither a penal code nor even a body of verdicts, which
13. I. Kant, K ritik der U rteilskraft, (KUK); Kant-Werkausgabe, vol. X, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M, 
p. 24; cf. english translation: L Kant, Critique o f Judgement, trans, by W. S. Pluhar, Hackett 
Publishing Copmany, Indianapolis 1987, p. 400.
14. J.-F. Lyotard, L ’Enthousiasme. La ciritique kantienne de l'histoire, Galilée, Paris 1986.
15. I. Kant, KUK, Einleitung, op. cit,  pp. 81; engl, trans. pp. 12.
16. I. Kant, KRV, op. cit,  p.l3.
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would allow him to lead to inquiry or to formulate verdicts.«17 Critical 
philosophy does not function as an instance which applies a given rule to new 
phenomena. The legal norm or the rule with regard to which the critical 
philosopher brings the verdict is established only in the process of judgment, 
the object of the verdict being even the possibility of the application of the 
rule to the given material. The subsumption of a separate example by the 
universal law is not typical of the critical proceedings; critical philosophy 
rather is given the role of the instance that enunciates »das ist der Fall« -  
»that is the case,« this proposition holds true, it is »an example of the rule,«18 
it is a model example of the beautiful, the good, the reasonable... The 
definition of the model rule is a procedure that establishes the universal direct 
in the particular: the application of the rule is at the same time the process of 
its constitution.
Kant calls attention to the fact that the critique of pure reason is systematic 
and thorough,19 but the critical philosophical proposition is reflective and not 
determinative in its nature.20 Our statement that criticism has a reflective 
structure implies two things. First, if we assume that the rule with regard to 
which the tribunal of reason judges its example is established only in the 
process of critical judgment, the critical examination of the a priori power of 
cognition is not a cognitive standpoint which is before and outside the 
cognition itself. On the contrary, critical judgment is always already included 
in a specific way in the sphere that it judges: after all, the rule of judging the 
demands for the validity of different cognitive powers is established only in 
the verdict that defines the example of the rule. And second, because the 
universal is intrinsic to its particular, because the rule exists only in a concrete 
example, judgment never has at its disposal either the final rule or an 
ultimately determined universal. The absence of the already given rule or the 
given universal, which is essential to reflective judgment, is reflected in two 
ways in Kant: either in the orientation of judgment towards the endless search 
for the criterion of criteria, or in the form of an attempt to base the power of 
judgment on a »natural gift,«21 indeterminable in the last instance. In both 
cases, however, the absence of the rule in not defined as such, in its positive 
meaning.
If we are to understand the model of reflective judgment, the very absence of 
determination, on which this judgment is based, has to be defined. Lyotard, 
too, calls attention to the necessity of such a definition in his observation that 
reflection is marked by a manner of determining a particular object that also
17. J.-F. Lyotard, op. tit, p. 18.
18. Cf. I. Kant, »Über den Gemeinspruch...«, op. cit.
19. I. Kant, KRV, op. tit, p. 65.
20 . For the distinction determinative judgment -  reflective judgment cf. I. Kant, KUK, 
Einleitung, op. tit,  p. 87; engl. transi, p. 20/21.
21 . I. Kant, KRV, op. tit,  p. 185.
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contains the moment of the undetermining among its determinative rules.22 
The reflective structure of critique, the process of searching for the universal, 
in which the universal is but being established, appears in this respect as an 
attempt at the articulation of a moment of the undetermined, which as such is 
determinative for our cognitive power, as an attempt at the definition of a 
radical loss, on which each cognitive determination of the object is based.
Kant’s answer to the problem that the positive condition of each cognitive 
determination of the object is also a moment of the undetermined represents 
the model of the reflective aesthetic judgment in Critique o f Judgment. It is 
characteristic of the aesthetic judgment that it lacks a notion that would lead 
it, and that it is not directed towards the construction of the universal notion. 
Nevertheless, the reflective aesthetic judgment is not a judgment that would 
not be capable of achieving its basic purpose, firm notional determination. It is 
not a judgment blocked and therefore turned back into itself, reproducing its 
own self.23 What is at stake in Kant’s conceptualization of aesthetic judgment 
is something else: to find the notion for the moment of the irréductible want 
of notionality, which only establishes aesthetic judgment as a judgment of 
universal validity, to find notional determination that will determine the 
absence of notional determination as the essential determination of the notion.
With his statement that Kant’s critical philosophy is in fact reflexive,24 
Lyotard already transcends the framework drawn for critique and reflection by 
Kant in Critique o f Pure Reason. Lyotard’s statement interprets both the 
notion of critique as well as the notion of reflection from the standpoint of 
Critique o f judgment. His retroactive reading of Kant’s Critiques implies that 
it is only with Kant’s critical discovery of aesthetics in the third Critique that 
the concept of critique gets developed in all its meaning. In the first Critique, 
reflection is defined as »thinking (reflexio), which does not deal with objects 
themselves in order to get notions direct from them, but it is a state of mind in 
which we first prepare ourselves for the discovery of subjective conditions, on 
which we can come to notions.«25 The universal vocation of the power of 
judgment is that it is »an ability of subsuming under rule, i.e., distinguishing 
whether something belongs under the given rule or not (casus datae legis)2<s; 
the basic problem of the transcendental power of judgment, how to present 
pure rational notions in sensible intuition, is dealt with by the theory of 
schematism. Within this framework, reflection is hardly more than some kind 
of the »subjective side« of the basic objective cognitive function, which the 
power of judgment has when showing those sensible conditions on which pure 
rational notions can be used: instead of to object, reflection refers to cognitive
22 . J.-F. Lyotard, op. ti t , p. 12.
23 . About self-reproduction of the aesthetic judgment cf. I. Kant, KUK, § 12.
24 . J.-F. Lyotard, op. til,  p. 12.
25 . L Kant, KRV, op. ti t , p. 285.
26 . Ibid, p. 184.
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power itself or to the relation between different cognitive powers. Within this 
framework, the basic activity of the power of judgment is subsumption, 
reflective judgment being just the subordinated, derived modus of the 
subsumptive activity. Here the absence of the determinative notion, whose 
example the power of judgment could follow, plays only the role of the 
postponed, not yet achieved, presence of the notion.
As soon as we get to understand the absence of the notion, the moment of the 
constitutive indetermination of critical judgment to be the essential moment of 
critique as reflection, we no longer subordinate reflection to the subsumptive 
logic of the theoretic cognition of the object, but we ascribe an independent 
cognitive position to it, as in Kant’s third Critique. The concept of the 
reflective power of judgment is Kant’s answer to the question of how to find a 
notion that would not have the characteristics of the Adornits notion, the 
notion for the non-notional -  how to determine notionally the indeterminable 
without drowning it in the notion.27 In Critique o f Judgment the difference 
between determinative and reflective judgments is shown as their radical 
contrast, whereas the reflective power of judgment is put forward as specific 
and original cognitive power,28 which is as important as the power of the 
objective theoretic cognition of the object. Its autonomous status makes 
possible the »reflective« reading of Kant’s entire opus and demands at the 
same time that we should correct the traditional image of Kant’s criticism. 
Since Hegel, criticism has been reproached for trying to perform research into 
cognition before the cognition, that critical judgment is in the same relation of 
the exterior to its object as tools are to their object. This topos, referring to the 
instrumental nature of Kant’s cognitive critique, is undoubtedly justified, yet 
simplified, considering the problems treated in Kant’s third Critique. It 
neglects the fact that the exterior of cognition is possible in criticism only on 
the basis of specific inclusion of the interior of cognition in its object, which 
critique articulates as reflection. In other words, the reflective structure of 
Kant’s cognitive critique does not allow us to read the critical research of 
cognitive power before cognition simply as an attempt to secure a firm basis of
27. Cf. I. Kant, I. Kant, KUK, Vorrede, p. 75; engl. transi, p. 6: »So judgement itself must provide a 
concept, a concpet through which we do not actually cognize anything but which only serves 
as a rule for the power of judgement, since then we would need another power of judgement 
in order to decide whether or not the judgement is a case o f that rule.«
28. Here we rest upon the detailed analysis o f Kant’s third Critique in the work by F. Guillermit 
L ’éducation critique du jugem ent de goût selon Kant, Editions du CNRS, Paris 1986. 
Guillermit calls attention to the fact that Kant’s argumentation introduces a new type of the 
universal through the contrast between determinative and reflective judgments. In the third 
Critique, too, we can find some traces o f understanding that determines the power of 
judgment as a mere activity of subsumption. So in § 35, for example, the difference between 
determinative and reflective judgments is comprehended as the difference between the level 
of the product (notion and intuition) and the level of the producing power (reason and 
imaginative power), the power of judgment in both cases preserving the same form of 
subsumptive activity (cf. L. Guillermit, op. citv p. 45).
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cognition, excepted from any cognitive doubt. We should rather read it as a 
standpoint that tries to articulate the moment of indetermination, which is the 
basis of the theoretic and practical, in the last instance judicial, cognitive 
determination of the object.
On the basis of what has been said so far, we can now return to the starting 
point, to the notion of form and its topical meaning. We agree with M. Frank’s 
thought that for Kant form does not mean a picture, an outline or 
configuration, but it stands above all for the indetermination with the material 
principle, the absence of reference to material content. The analysis of Kant’s 
third Critique and the model of reflective judgment helps us to understand 
better the absence of material content expressed by the notion of form. On the 
basis of the principal purpose of reflective judgment -  to articulate the 
moment of indeterminable, upon which it itself is based -  M. Frank’s thought 
can also be expressed as follows: form is not the result of abstraction, the 
removal of material content; it represents a concept with which the absence of 
content as such is defined, a concept in which absence itself is present.
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